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Abstract  
 
This thesis studies the impact of macro stress testing on the riskiness of the 
participating banks. We use a dataset on 48 banks participating in either or both of 
the 2010 and 2011 EU exercises performed by the CEBS/EBA and 17 peer banks that 
did not participate. We find that early announcement of the 2010 stress test led to a 
temporary capitalization increase for the participating banks. We also find that 
disclosure of the 2011 exercise results caused a decline in capitalization for the 
participating banks. The results indicate that the way stress tests are prepared and 
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Abstrakt  
 
Tato práce zkoumá dopad makro stres testů na rizikovost účastnících se bank. Pro 
analýzu využíváme soubor 48 bank účastnících se alespoň jednoho ze stres testů které 
v letech 2010 a 2011 v EU provedla CEBA/EBA a 17 bank které se neúčastnily. 
Zjistili jsme, že brzké oznámení stres testu z roku 2010 vedlo ke krátkodobému 
navýšení úrovně kapitalizace účastnících se bank. Také jsme zjistili, že zveřejnění 
výsledků stres testu z roku 2011 způsobilo pokles úrovně kapitalizace účastníků. 
Výsledky naznačují, že způsob, jakým jsou stres testy připraveny a komunikovány, 
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Résumé 
 
Cette thèse étudie l'impact des macro stress tests sur le degré de risque des banques 
participantes. Nous utilisons un ensemble de données sur 48 banques participant à 
l'une ou les deux exercices de l'UE de 2010 et 2011 effectués par le CECB/EBA et 17 
banques de pairs qui ne participent pas. Nous trouvons que l'annonce précoce de 
stress test de 2010 a conduit à une augmentation de la capitalisation temporaire pour 
les banques participantes. Nous trouvons également que la communication des 
résultats de l'exercice de 2011 ont causé un déclin de la capitalisation pour les 
banques participantes. Les résultats indiquent que les manières stress tests sont établis 
et communiqués peuvent fortement influencer la façon dont les banques réagissent en 
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Bank Responsiveness to Calls for De-risking: The Case of EU Stress Testing 
Motivation: 
In order to maintain a well functioning and stable banking industry, an effective regulatory 
framework is of crucial importance. Recent financial and sovereign debt crises, however, 
have shown that with changes in the industry, regulation needs to adjust as well in order to 
contain newly emerging risks and threats. This paper will examine the current situation, 
focusing on the determinants of bank risk-taking behavior. Specifically, we will estimate bank 
reactions to pressure to take less risk from different channels.  
 
The aim of the paper is to determine whether the banks are influenced by the three following 
factors: new information about their risk profile and exposures; official but not binding 
warning by a regulatory authority; pressure from shareholders. With this information it would 
be possible to adjust current regulatory and supervisory trends and utilize those channels 
that work the strongest. In order to test this issue empirically, I will utilize the latest EU-wide 
stress test results and recommendations published by the European Banking Authority 
(2011). 
 
So far, there has been a decent body of literature on the topic of supervision trying to 
determine which approach is the most effective. The majority of this literature examines the 
influence of supervisory approaches on different measures of the banking performance and 
stability (see eg. Barth, Caprio, & Levine, 2006, 2012, 2013; Cihak & Demirguc-Kunt, 2012; 
Etzioni, 2009; Chortareas, Girardone, & Ventouri, 2012; Pasiouras, Tanna, & Zopounidis, 
2009). The aim of this paper, however, is to decompose this connection and only scrutinize 
its first part - the question of how banks respond to different sources of influence, leaving the 
specific impact of this influence on effectiveness and stability aside. Similar approach was 
used by Bischof and Daske (2012), who analyzed the effect of information disclosure rules 
on bank risk-taking behavior.  
Hypotheses: 
1. Hypothesis #1: The EU-wide stress test performed by the European Banking 
Authority in 2011 had a significant impact on bank behavior. 
2. Hypothesis #2: The reaction of shareholders and the test score were significant 
determinants of the banks response. 
3. Hypothesis #3: Ceteris paribus on the test result, the non-binding recommendation 
did not affect the bank behavior. 
Methodology: 
In order to estimate the issue at hand, I will use three primary sources of data. Firstly, the 
results of the 2011 stress test by the EBA which contain data on 91 banks operating in the 
EU. This source will provide information among other on the individual bank results in 
different scenarios and their exposure to sovereigns. Secondly, the Bankscope database with 
data on individual banks and the development of their capital and risk structure after the 
stress test. Thirdly, I will use Bloomberg or other financial tool to obtain historical bank stock 
prices. With this data I will use regression models to determine the significance of different 
influence channels.  
 
  viii 
The power of shareholders will be estimated as the effect of stock price change on banks’ 
own capital structure. This approach works with the underlying assumption that upon 
surprisingly bad results the market would “punish” the bank and its price would drop which 
would trigger remedial measures in banks riskiness to counter act this downswing. For this 
purpose, I also use the contributions of Wolff and Angeloni (2012) and Wolff (2011) who test 
the influence of stress test results on bank stock performance. 
 
The influence of official recommendations and the information on bank riskiness itself will be 
estimated together. In this case I will regress bank response on its stress test results and 
recommendation category (in case it was issued a recommendation). The expectation is that 
in case the recommendation itself is influencing bank behavior, it will be a significant 
determinant of the response on the top of bank score which contains information on the 
actual risks. 
Expected Contribution: 
Contrary to much of the current literature, we will analyze only the first part of the regulation-
outcome event chain. I will only focus on how banks respond to different sources of pressure 
which will enable a more detailed view on this matter. Moreover, I will estimate the results 
based on the latest available information and therefore the analysis will account for any 
structural or institutional changes which might have taken place during the Great recession. 
With this information, it will be clearer, whether it is effective to focus on ensuring sufficient 
transparency of the banks, issue official warnings or simply provide them with additional 
information about their exposures and possible threats.  
Outline: 
1. Introduction and motivation 
2. Banking supervision theories (private and public supervision concepts and different 
ways to influence bank behavior) and introduction to stress testing 
3. Data, its sources and descriptive statistics 
4. Methodology used for the analysis, its advantages and disadvantages 
5. Results and robustness checks 
6. Conclusion of my main findings and the implications, suggestions for further research  
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Development & changes after the writing of the thesis: 
Over the course of writing of the thesis, the hypotheses have been slightly adjusted. Given 
the lack of research on the topic of stress test influence on banks, we focused on this specific 
link. Therefore, we slightly shifted our main focus from the responsiveness of the banks to 
the impact of the stress tests. Finally, we have included the 2010 stress test which enabled 
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Introduction  
Since the onset of the Great Recession, banking regulation has become an 
increasingly dynamic and complex field. Many of the former strategies have been 
invalidated or are now considered as incomplete or inefficient. This impulse forced 
the authorities to bring forward new approaches and tools to achieve their goals. 
Macro stress testing is one of the tools that experienced the biggest expansion and 
today it is regularly used to obtain information about the resilience of banking 
systems around the world. This thesis examines the impact stress testing exercises on 
the riskiness of the participating banks. 
The authorities do not state impact on capitalization (and subsequently risk profiles) 
among one of the aims of the exercises and little attention has been paid to the link 
until now in the academic literature. One of the primary goals of banking regulation, 
however, is ensuring financial and monetary stability (Spong, 2000) and stress testing 
is one of the tools the authorities use to achieve this goal. Therefore, it is important 
for us to know how the exercises themselves affect banking stability and riskiness. 
Moreover, if there are positive and/or negative influences, we should know what 
triggers and affects them so that we can operate with them consciously.  
To study this relationship, we empirically analyze the results of the 2010 and 2011 
stress tests performed in the EU and their impact on bank capitalization. Given the 
fact that academic literature mostly focused on the reaction of the markets, this work 
presents the first empirical analysis of the influence on capitalization levels.  
According to our results the banks stress tested in 2011 experienced a decrease in 
capitalization in comparison to the banks that did not participate. This is consistent 
with the research on market reaction which indicates that the exercise has been 
viewed negatively owing to lack of scenario credibility and commitment by the 
authorities. By increasing the cost of financing, this caused a real shock to the banks 
and further decreased their capitalization in the turbulent times. 
The bank themselves also intentionally adjusted their portfolios during the 2010 
stress test. Decreasing their riskiness before the stress test and reversing this change 
afterwards enabled them to achieve better result but potentially destabilized the 
banking sector. Changes in the methodology prevented the banks to repeat this 
strategy in 2011 which suggests that the EBA continuously strives to improve the 
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exercise. This is especially valuable since, as we have seen, these changes play a 
crucial role in determining the exercise’s impact on banks’ capitalization. 
The results are particularly interesting since they offer the first assessment of the 
impact of macro stress testing on bank riskiness. While the thesis raises a number of 
questions that it does not answer, we identify several channels which are worth 
noting and we start developing arguments for their theoretical understanding. This, in 
turn, provides a basis for further research that will help fully clarify the impact of 
stress testing and enable the authorities to use it with maximum efficiency while 
minimizing its drawbacks. The ability to optimize the process is then especially 
valuable at times of crises, such as the year 2011 when instead of stabilization the 
stress test delivered another hit to the banking sector. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. The next section discusses basic 
theories and facts regarding banking regulation and stress testing. Section 2 presents 
the results of research previously conducted on this topic and discusses our 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and methods used. Section 4 analyzes the 
impact of macro stress testing on risk profiles of the participating institutions. Finally, 
section 5 concludes. 
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1 Theoretical Background 
1.1 Why Do We Regulate 
Today, banks are the cornerstone institutions of our economies. Through economies 
of scale they help allocate capital efficiently and thus optimize the wealth generation 
in societies. In general, we can recognize four essential contributions that help 
achieve this goal.  
Firstly, banks aggregate small amounts of short term capital, which are then 
transformed into larger amounts of long-term capital. Through this mechanism, we 
overcome the otherwise very problematic issue of matching lenders and borrowers. 
We could speak of this issue as of a special case of double coincidence of wants,
1
 
where as a borrower you need to find a lender who is both willing to lend you the 
required sum and willing to wait long enough for you to repay.  
Secondly, banks enable economies to operate faster and facing lower transaction 
costs by facilitating payment systems (Cirasino & Garcia, 2008). The payment 
systems provide safe monetary transfers and reduce webs of bilateral contracts to 
simple contract of the end counterparties.  
Thirdly, the large amounts of deposits and loans enable banks to gather extensive 
amounts of data on both their counterparties and the economy overall. Through this 
information they can reliably estimate default probabilities and use interest rate 
margins to compensate for the losses.  
Lastly, large portfolios of diversified investments provide opportunity to overcome 
risk-aversion and operate as a risk-neutral agent on the markets who generates 
additional value and promotes growth (Crockett, 2011). 
These functions, however, place banks in a unique situation where they don’t just 
provide goods or services – they have become a necessary condition that enables 
goods and services provision in the economy as a whole. With gradual creation of 
                                                 
1
 Double coincidence of wants and needs is a concept from economies without money where economic 
agents are required both to find a product they desire to buy and have something the counterparty will 
accept in exchange 
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this unique position, governments started to regulate the industry in order to ensure 
provision of these essential services. These regulations are aiming to counterbalance 
a wide array of inherent threats and problems that are connected to banking. 
Following the lead of Groenwegen, Spithooven, and van den Berg (2010) we identify 
four primary issues that threaten proper functioning of the economy: 
Natural monopolies. For companies that base their existence on scaling their business 
in terms of capital, data, and customers, the threat that one player becomes too 
powerful it never too distant. In a simplified framework, the size would give the 
biggest institution competitive advantage and it would consequently use this 
advantage to put all its competitors out of business, while no new market entrant 
could threaten this position because they would not have the economies of scale. 
Absent competitive pressure this monopoly player could then raise margins at the 
cost of overall welfare. 
Externalities. Firstly, default of one bank can have a significantly negative effect on 
other banks directly through interbank market operations. Secondly, given imperfect 
information on the side of depositors and high level of interconnectedness, such 
situation can cause unsubstantiated panic and lead to mass deposit withdrawals (bank 
run). Working together, these two forces can transform any single-bank problems into 
a banking crisis which damages the economy both directly through banks’ defaults on 
their obligations and systemic inability to efficiently allocate credit. 
Imperfect information. Depositors do not have the ability to reassess the banks’ 
riskiness with ever transaction and determine whether the price (usually in form of an 
interest rate) is adequate. Therefore, regulators offer guarantees which reduce the 
uncertainty and eliminate or at least mitigate this transaction cost. 
Public goods. Regulation itself could be seen as a public good as we cannot exclude 
others from its benefits and the effect it has on one party does not in any way reduce 
the effect on other parties. In case of public goods it is irrational for any individual 
player to generate this benefit, because while he bears the costs, all other parties 
could only enjoy the benefits at no cost. Therefore, a central player has to intervene 
and provide the good. 
1.2 Theories Behind Bank Risk-taking 
We have established that banking plays a key role in today’s economies and that this 
generates an array of threats to the stability and efficiency of the economy which the 
regulators try to mitigate. In this section, we specifically focus on one of the sources 
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that generate some of the failures – excessive risk-taking and the mechanisms that 
allow and promote it.  
In order to mitigate the principal-agent problem, it is common to offer bank 
executives compensation packages tied to the performance of the bank. Bebchuk and 
Spamann (2010) note that the very common equity-based rewards motivate 
executives to take excessive risks since they enjoy the benefits but do not suffer the 
downside. Similar results are presented by Chen, Steiner, and Whyte (2006) who 
specifically focus on the impact of stock options and Guay (1999) who finds that 
incentive schemes influence firms’ stock-return volatility. 
When we move our focus to the bank as a whole, we discover that it finds itself in a 
situation not unlike the executives. With the limited liability concept in place, the 
downside of any investment is limited for the shareholders. This motivates the banks 
to increase their risks and leverage to maximize the potential profits which are not 
limited (Blum, 2002; Burakov, 2014). Historically, we have witnessed other concepts 
such as unlimited liability or double liability which decreases bank risk-taking but 
they have been mostly abandoned (Grossman, 2001). Government guarantees and 
deposit insurance schemes also fuel this asymmetry by effectively covering the cost 
of bank failures by taxpayers’ money. 
Furthermore, the limited liability concept is not strictly restricted to the financial 
realm. Some question whether it is right that no high-level executive was successfully 
prosecuted in response to the recent economic meltdown, especially in contrast to the 
past crises where the top figures of the financial world were commonly successfully 
prosecuted (Rakoff, 2014).  
1.3 Regulation 
Today, in an attempt to provide solutions for these problems, curtail the risk, and 
ensure economic stability, governments use an interventionist approach which makes 
banking the most regulated of all industries (Chortareas et al., 2012). Yet, we are still 
witnesses to recurring economic crises that hinder our economies and have a severe 
impact on our well-being (Laeven & Valencia, 2012). Although the regulations are 
not 100% effective, most of the world’s economies are still pursuing this approach 
and trying to fix its issues rather than leaving all work to the invisible hand of market. 
In this section we present a brief description of the most discussed and used 
regulatory tools that have been used over the course of the last few decades. Rather 
than exhausting all approaches, we try to outline the most common approaches that 
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are used by regulators and supervisors to influence banks. For each of the approaches 
we also the state economic rationale and discuss its advantages and setbacks.  
Gaining prominence with the introduction of the Basel Capital Accord (BCBS, 2004), 
capital requirements have become the cornerstone of bank regulation. By putting 
equity at risk, they promote more prudent behaviour and decrease the incentives for 
gambling where gains are internalized and losses externalized (French et al., 2010). 
On the other hand, it is costly as it decreases the banks’ capacity to create liquidity 
and, consequently, access to credit (Van den Heuvel, 2008). Some authors point out 
that capital requirements can be pro-cyclical (Heid, 2007) or require additional tools 
such as leverage ratio restriction and liquidity requirements (Blum, 2008; Morris & 
Shin, 2008). A paper by Schuermann (2014) even claims that due to opaqueness and 
possibility of asset substitution in banking stress tests are the optimal complement to 
capital requirements. Yet, despite all the criticism and downsides, Admati et al. 
(2010) claim that bank equity is not that costly and suggest that a significant increase 
in equity requirements would lead to large social benefits. 
Historically, some of the most used regulations were activity restrictions. They were 
aiming to separate the more risky banking activities from the traditional commercial 
banking to prevent risk contagion from the former to the latter (the Glass-Steagall Act 
is the best known example of such policies). The value of this separation was further 
amplified by the introduction of deposit insurance schemes which presented a severe 
moral hazard issue. With insurance, the banks were protected from the greatest costs 
of failure and thus they could take on more risk. Despite the fact that for almost half a 
century activity restrictions succeeded to prevent any significant crises in the US, it 
was ultimately abandoned in 1999 due to an increased pressure from the banks who 
claimed it was too costly in terms of efficiency and that it disregarded the increasing 
complexity of the markets (Baradaran, 2014). Also, some authors claim that activity 
restrictions could actually harm the banking system as they limit diversification on 
the side of banks (Uhde & Heimeshoff, 2009).  
Deposit insurance, on the contrary, has stayed and is currently expanding. Its original 
intention of this policy was to prevent bank-runs that plagued the world during the 
Great Depression. Some current research, however, points out that it actually 
adversely impacts bank stability due to its positive effect on moral hazard, especially 
so in countries with less developed institutions (Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 
2002).  
In the recent years, one of the trends that we have witnessed is a partial return back to 
private monitoring by the markets. The regulators facilitate this by enhancing the 
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transparency and disclosure of information by banks.  Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Levine (2006) note that it facilitates “efficient corporate finance and ... integrity of 
bank lending” (p. 27). The downside, however, is that the incentives to monitor banks 
are significantly decreased by the deposit insurance schemes. One of the currently 
expanding instruments of data gathering and verification is also the one we focus on 
– stress testing. 
1.4 Stress Testing 
Stress testing represents an improvement to the methodologies and data gathering 
techniques and supports the final regulatory decisions. According to Quagliariello 
(2009), stress tests are defined as “... quantitative tools used by banking supervisors 
and central banks for assessing the soundness of financial systems in the event of 
extreme but still plausible shocks (macroeconomic stress tests). They are also an 
important management instrument for banks since they provide financial institutions 
with useful indications on the reliability of the internal systems designed for the 
measurement of risks (microeconomic or prudential stress tests)” (p. 1). Although this 
definition captures the general idea, it is also important to remember that there are 
other aspects of stress testing that lead to variations.  
In the end the underlying idea of stress testing is that it should uncover any systemic 
or institutional fragility and enable the institutions or the regulator to remedy it in 
time by strengthening the system foundations. Generally, the foundations are 
represented by capital requirements (EBA, 2014b).  
Generally, stress tests are performed on two levels. The micro stress tests focus on 
individual financial institutions and evaluate their stability. The outcome is very 
valuable to the management, but can be unreliable if the bank is examined in isolation 
and feedback loops are disregarded. Therefore, regulators and international 
institutions perform macro stress tests which focus more on the system as a whole 
and take into account links between institutions and systemic fragilities. Furthermore, 
macro level testing can be either based on an analysis of individual borrowers 
(bottom-up approach) or an analysis of portfolios that are assumed homogeneous 
(top-down approach). Overall, the micro and macro approaches are complementary 
and should not be relied upon individually as they can omit crucial information. 
On the macro level, regulators perform the tests by specifying possible adverse 
scenarios which are provided to the banks. The banks then have to test these 
scenarios and provide information on what would be their standing in such a case, 
which is then scrutinized and serves a range of purposes. Firstly, the regulators assess 
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whether the capital, liquidity, lending levels etc. are consistent with orderly 
functioning of the economy and in case of any problems step in to remedy these 
issues. Secondly, such exercise helps them better understand the market dynamics 
and thus generate more efficient rules. Thirdly, in case of information disclosure 
stress tests help inform investors and analysts and thus promote market discipline 
through monitoring by private counterparties. Finally, disclosed information can have 
positive impact on stabilization of the markets in case there is uncertainty among the 
institutions or overall bad mood (Jobst, Ong, & Schmieder, 2013). 
The first consistent stress-testing was, however, on the micro level and emerged in 
the 1990s when large financial institutions used it as a complementary tool to other 
risk measures such as value at risk to asses and manage own institutional risks 
(Quagliariello, 2009). This way banks tested the impact of any potential event they 
could come up with. Only in 1996 regulators started focusing on this tool, too, with 
the amendment to Basel I which aimed to incorporate market risk in banks’ 
regulatory capital calculations (BCBS, 2005). 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2002) in its technical guidance document 
specifically requires banks to use micro stress tests as a precondition for determining 
own risk-weights of assets:  
“An IRB [internal rating based] bank must have in place sound stress 
testing processes for use in the assessment of capital adequacy. Stress 
testing must involve identifying possible events or future changes in 
economic conditions that could have unfavourable effects on a banks’ credit 
exposures and assessment of the banks’ ability to withstand such changes. 
Examples of scenarios that usefully could be examined are (i) economic or 
industry downturns; (ii) market-risk events; and (iii) liquidity conditions” 
(p. 74-75). 
The effect that Basel is trying to capture is predominantly a direct impact on single 
institution caused by a decrease in market rating (resulting in changed capital 
requirements due to change in risk-weighted assets).  
As early as 2000 the regulators recognized that rapid growth and innovation of the 
sector call for a more complex solution and started looking into the possibility of 
micro level results aggregation (Committee on the Global Financial System, 2000). 
Also Goodhart (2006) noted before the crisis that micro approach by itself is not 
sufficient, because any deterioration in market condition would affect the bank not 
only directly but also indirectly through other market participants such as capital 
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providers or customers. Therefore, he recommended implementation of a model 
which would test the whole banking system, taking into account all the inter-linkages 
and possibly even connections to the real economy. In this, he confirmed the views of 
Hellwig (1995) who warned that microecnonomically sound institutions may still 
form a fragile system if there is high amount if interbank borrowing. 
Although most of the G-10 countries started using stress tests as early as 2001 
(Quagliariello, 2009), only with the recent crisis stress testing became prominent and 
received wide attention from the regulators. With this recognition as a powerful 
regulatory instrument came also methodological improvements dealing with 
insufficiencies that decreased the efficiency earlier tests (e.g. inclusion contagion and 
liquidity or testing of complex shock scenarios). Despite the upgrades, however, 
recent versions of the exercises still attract lots of discussion and many authors point 
to insufficiencies that prevent regulators from achieving the desirable outcome 
(Cerutti & Schmieder, 2014). Carosio (2009) even stated that “... [n]otwithstanding 
the undeniable advances of the methodologies and applications, it is fair to say that 
the framework has not yet reached a steady state. Almost all contributors very openly 
claim that the challenges for stress-testing are still significant and there is room for 
further developments” (p. xxii). 
The crisis developments were also reflected in one of the major documents that Great 
recession gave rise to – Basel III capital accord. The BCBS (2009) noted in a 
preliminary report on sound practices in stress testing, that while stress tests had been 
performed by banks, they were unable to foresee the losses and offer guidance on 
how to prevent this situation in the future. They identified four key aspects that need 
to be addressed: (i) the banks should integrate stress testing in their overarching risk 
management processes as opposed to performing it separately in an isolated manner 
or for selected departments/business lines (this also enables flexible action which 
takes into account aggregate risks across the institution including potential feedback 
loops); (ii) reliance on historical data should be limited as they tend to get unreliable 
with prolonged periods of growth or stability; (iii) stress scenarios need to be re-
constructed, accounting for longer lasting, more severe conditions with potential 
amplification effects; (iv) specifics of each product should be evaluated and taken 
into account in order to prevent serious miscalculations such as was the case of 
structured products and leveraged lending during the crisis. These recommendations 
were then incorporated even in the final Basel III document (BCBS, 2011). 
Currently, the two most prominent stress testing initiatives are those of the US and 
European Union. In the US, mandatory regular stress testing has been introduced by 
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the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) in 2009 as a reaction to the crisis. In the 
Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) banking institutions with assets 
over $100 billion were required to project revenues and losses under a) scenario that 
was agreed upon as a probable by the economists and b) adverse scenario with 
stronger impact. Later, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (DFA) introduced annual testing performed by the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council in 2010. Under this Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) 
all banks and nonbank financial companies take part in this exercise, but they also 
need to carry out own stress test twice a year (quarterly for systemically important 
institutions). In the case of the US, DFA leaves discretion to regulators who decide 
how much data will be released or if the exercise will be focused on each individual 
bank or rather banking sector resilience as a whole (Goldstein & Sapra, 2013). 
In the EU, stress testing is performed by the EBA
2
 in cooperation with ESRB in order 
to “… assess the resilience of financial institutions to adverse market developments, 
as well as to contribute to the overall assessment of systemic risk in the EU financial 
system” (EBA, n.d.). The EBA has performed 4 EU-wide stress tests complemented 
by several other exercises (EU-wide Transparency exercise, EU Capital exercise) up 
to date with the latest stress test results disclosed in October 2014. In the latest round 
123 EU (Eurozone, non-Eurozone and Norwegian) banking groups were covered and 
up to 12,000 data points including the P&L, RWAs, sovereign exposures, credit risk 
and composition of capital were disclosed for each of them (EBA, 2014a).  
Perhaps the most followed outcome of the test is the common equity tier 1 capital 








where total risk exposure equals to risk weighted assets of the bank as defined by the 
Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive IV (CRR/CRD IV) adopted in 2011 
by the Commission. In case the bank score in the adverse and baseline scenario falls 
below 5.5% and 8%, respectively, immediate action is undertaken with the intention 
to remedy this weakness. Given the construction of this indicator, there are ways the 
bank can influence it. Either the bank raises additional capital or it decreases the 
amount of total risk exposures. As (BCBS, 2014) notes, while smaller banks tended 
                                                 
2
 In 2011 the EBA replaced the Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
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to increase both the exposures and the capital over the past years, the internationally 
active banks used both of these instruments to improve their capitalization. 
Despite the undeniable advance during the post-crisis period, stress testing is still a 
centrepiece of a heated debate and many authors pinpoint further deficiencies to the 
framework. Cerutti and Schmieder (2014) warn that the since the current tests are 
based on consolidated financials, they are unable to capture the true nature and detail 
of their distribution. This may be especially a problem in case the bank needs to 
move liquidity to other regulatory jurisdiction but the regulators limit these flows 
(ring-fencing). Examples of this behaviour have already been observed during the 
crisis when the host regulators, who were trying to protect their market, unilaterally 
restricted capital outflows. 
Level of information disclosure, which is currently very high for both the US and EU 
regulators, is discussed in Goldstein (2014) who claims that although the literature 
has presented some benefits, regular disclosure also presents setbacks. In his theory 
banks get swayed into focusing on passing the exercise, rather than engage in prudent 
risk-taking behaviour. Also, he notes that testing just few scenarios does not provide 
sufficiently precise view of the sector. While there are many variables (and their) 
combinations that can negatively affect the banks, only one or two (in the EU and the 
US, respectively) adverse scenarios are being tested. Finally, he warns that despite 
the unpredictability of crises (see for example the black swan event concept 
popularized by Taleb [2007]), the scenarios are generally based on historical events 
(see also e.g. Steinhauser, 2014). 
Third issue had been debated extensively before the last two EU stress test rounds 
and touches the topic of political correctness. The critique emphasizes that the stress 
scenarios fail to tackle politically sensitive topics such as Greek sovereign default for 
the 2011 exercise and escalated impact of the Crimean crisis or EU-level deflation for 
the 2014 exercise (Jenkins & Murphy, 2011; Steinhauser, 2014). Indeed, the 
authorities have incentives not to include such scenarios. The inclusion would signal 
to the markets that they are perceived as possible and thus implicitly increase their 
probability through the self-fulfilling prophecy mechanism. Although the EBA tried 
to solve this issue by disclosing large amounts of information which potentially 
enable recreation on modification of the scenarios (Jenkins & Murphy, 2011), it is 
unclear whether the analysts have sufficient capacity to perform such analysis – and 
if they do, why stress testing shouldn’t be replaced by simple regular information 
disclosure since the authorities are constrained from presenting a scenario which 
would truly represent a relevant downturn. 
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2 Literature Review & Hypotheses 
As we have shown, banks have no shortage of reasons to take on excessive risks. 
Equity based compensation schemes promote short-sighted decisions (Bebchuk & 
Spamann, 2010), banks as a whole, shielded by limited liability of shareholders and 
government deposit insurance schemes, have incentives to take excessive risks due to 
internalization of profits and externalization of losses (Burakov, 2014), and contrary 
to previous crises there have been almost no legal consequences to the high level 
executives who took part in the Great Recession (Rakoff, 2014). 
The manifestation are the 147 banking crises that we experienced between the years 
1970 and 2011 (Laeven & Valencia, 2012) which significantly hit the economies and 
decreased the output (Hoggarth, Reis, & Saporta, 2002). The impact was especially 
strong for less developed countries which don’t have the required flexibility or 
institutions for efficient use of fiscal and monetary policies to mitigate the fiscal 
outlays connected to bank recapitalization (Laeven & Valencia, 2012).  
The process of bank failure can be seen as a natural genesis of the market that 
promotes survival of the fittest and disposes of the inefficient players (see e.g. Stiglitz 
[Evans-Pritchard, 2009] and Fama [2014] who promote the idea that banks during the 
Great recession should not have been supported). The general consensus shaping 
today’s regulation, however, is that the rules should be different due to a crucial role 
of banking in the economy, its vulnerability and extensive externalities. Therefore, 
the research focuses very intensively on determinants of risk-taking in banks and 
potential ways to influence this behaviour. 
2.1 General Market Influence on Risk-taking 
Firstly, overall effects of supervision on risk-taking are scrutinized. The general level 
and strength of supervision has proven to be a concern for banks which use their 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions to shift risks to less supervised countries (Buch 
& DeLong, 2008). In other words, countries with relatively higher deposit insurance 
and less strict regulation do ceteris paribus attract more risky bank operations. 
The government regulation itself, however, is not the only variable we have to take 
into account when we are trying to assess the final impact. Research shows that there 
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are other characteristics of the markets and banks that have significant influence on 
the risk-taking behaviour.  
Laeven and Levine (2009) show that ownership structure and private monitoring can 
be significant factors in predicting the riskiness of banks. They find that different 
ownership structures lead to different reactivity to government regulations and risk 
appetite. According to their findings, depending on the ownership structure, the same 
regulation can either encourage or decrease bank riskiness. Specifically, diversified 
owners (those with only a minor stake in the company) are much more prone to 
supporting higher risk levels than owners with substantial interest in the bank. The 
results are confirmed by the findings that higher shareholder concentration ratios lead 
to decreased risks (García-Marco & Robles-Fernández, 2008). Proposed explanations 
for this phenomenon are twofold. Either, the diversified owners deliberately 
maximize the expected return on their portfolio by increasing individual risks, or they 
are not able to control the bank efficiently and unwillingly allow the managers to 
increase risk. 
Bank size is another characteristic that can influence the impact of regulation. Using 
data on 546 banks in CEE Agoraki, Delis, and Pasiouras (2011) show that although 
capital requirements generally curb the risk levels, this effect is diminishing with 
bank size. Finally, according to their results the biggest banks tend to take on even 
more risk with increasing capital requirements. The size of the bank can also have a 
direct effect, as was shown in paper by García-Marco and Robles-Fernández (2008) 
who show that small banks generally assume lower risk levels. 
Other strain of research shows that even general market characteristics such as 
competition can affect bank risk-taking. For example, Schaeck, Cihak, and Wolfe 
(2009) find more competitive banking systems to be associated with lower crisis 
probabilities. The evidence for this claim, however, is not entirely persuasive as other 
authors claim that more competitive markets force banks to take on more risk (Dick, 
2006). 
2.2 Capital Requirements 
Of the specific rules applied around the world by regulators, capital requirements are 
perhaps the most discussed one. Although this has been one of the main instruments 
of bank regulation over the past decades, academics have not yet come to a definitive 
agreement on their overall effect on the stability or fragility of banking systems.  
Literature Review & Hypotheses   14     14 
On the one hand, Blum (1999) argues that increasing capital requirements pressures 
banks to increase their risks for two reasons. Firstly, due to decreased profits in the 
future and limited liability the bankruptcy is less costly. Secondly, increasing 
regulatory capital may lead to an increase in marginal return on risk. Further, 
Hakenes and Schnabel (2011) show that current form of regulation – Basel II – is 
putting smaller banks into disadvantage as they cannot afford creation of internal 
rating model.
3
 Consequentially, they have to take on higher risks in order to make up 
for this disadvantage. 
On the other hand, the opinion that shapes the current practice is that capital 
requirements bolster banking sectors’ stability and decrease the overall risk (let Basel 
regulations, which are working with capital requirements extensively, be the proof of 
this statement). They do so through increasing shareholders’ stake in the banks and 
exposing them to higher potential loss in case of bankruptcy. Also, in case of failure 
of one of the institutions, the capital can be used to reimburse stakeholders and limit 
contagion to other banks. Along these two traditional reasons, Morrison et al. (2005) 
also add third way in which increased capital promotes soundness of banking 
markets. They show that it solves the adverse selection problem and “discourages 
unsound and unreliable institutions from setting up operations.”  
Furlong and Keeley (1989) in their model show that increases in regulatory capital 
reduce the incentives to take on asset risk. Despite some reservations towards the 
specifics of capital requirements implementation (especially the weight assignment 
under Basel I), Altman and Saunders (2001) claim that capital requirements are “a 
step in the right direction.” In their analysis of 143 countries, Cihak, Demirguc-Kunt, 
Peria, and Mohseni-Cheraghlou (2012) conclude that the occurrence of a systemic 
crisis in years 2007-2009 was significantly correlated with less stringent capital 
definitions lower capital adequacy ratios and more freedom for banks in actual 
computation of these ratios. 
Slightly different point of view is offered by Milne (2002) who claims that one 
channel of effect has long been neglected. According to his theory, capital 
requirements don’t necessarily only work as an ex-ante mechanism by generating a 
simple constraint for banks. Banks in his model are forward-looking optimizers who 
take into account a potential ex-post regulatory retaliation in case of capital 
                                                 
3
 Under Basel II, banks have a choice of methodologies to determine risk-weighted assets. Large banks 
can get additional option by developing own internal rating model which allows them to optimize 
between the different approaches.  
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requirements breach. In this view, banks that are not on the verge of bankruptcy have 
strong incentives to increase capitalization in order to reduce the risk of violating the 
rules. Further, Lindquist (2004) shows on a sample of Norwegian savings banks that 
with the increased size of their capital buffer the broad risk (represented by variation 
in previous profits) of the bank declines. 
2.3 Stress Testing  
In line with the theories of Milne (2002), who says that banks are trying to avoid ex-
post punishment for breach of regulations, the authorities are striving to come up with 
ever new ways of how to efficiently enforce their rules. One of the newly emerged 
methods is a system-wide stress testing.  
Further, when information is publicly disclosed the stress tests reveal banks’ 
resilience including levels of regulatory capital (as is the case for EBA’s 2010, 2011, 
and 2014 exercises). Through this mechanism, they decrease uncertainty on the 
markets and enable investors and analysts to make more informed decisions and 
reward or punish banks for their results (Flannery, Kwan, & Nimalendran, 2013).  
Petrella and Resti (2013) scrutinized this effect and discovered a significant reaction 
of the stock markets to the new information, thus rejecting the “irrelevance 
hypothesis” which claims that due to political constraints the 2011 EBA stress test 
was unable to capture any real adverse scenario (e.g. sovereign default of Greece 
which was in a very difficult situation at that time) and thus could not possibly bring 
any new information to the markets (Jenkins & Murphy, 2011). This result, 
confirming the value-added of the exercise, could be also explained by the fact that 
the newly disclosed information was not available and could not be produced based 
solely on the publicly available sources before the test (Petrella & Resti, 2013).  
An event study conducted by Candelon and Amadou (2015) focused on the effects of 
individual stress tests. According to them the market reaction was always 
significantly positive in the EU with only one exception – the 2011 stress test. They 
claim that enhanced disclosure does not help as long as the EBA estimates of 
sovereign losses are still lower than the market estimates. 
Langley (2013) shows that the exercises can significantly affect the market 
confidence. He argues that this was the case for the 2009 SCAP which stabilized the 
US markets. On the other hand, the exercises performed in the EU failed to deliver 
similar impact.  
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Ellahie (2013) argues that the EU exercises fulfilled their aim to reduce opacity in the 
banking sector and provide relevant and timely information. He, however, claims that 
the results published after the 2011 exercise led to a significant increase in 
uncertainty in both short- and long-term due to the banks’ doubtful health and lack of 
determination of the authorities to actively solve the uncovered problems. 
Gick and Pausch (2012) and Goldstein (2014) focus on the specific setup of stress-
testing exercise. They point to the fact that the level of information disclosure is 
paramount and they encourage regulators to provide as much information as possible 
in order to enable investors and analysts to test their own personalized scenarios. In 
this way the regulators can overcome the political rigidity that doesn’t allow them to 
prepare ‘worst case scenarios’ because they could cause panic on the markets. 
These hypotheses describing market reaction to stress tests currently form the 
majority of academic literature scrutinizing the impact of stress tests. Despite the fact 
that market reaction is not our focus, they will be of great use to us. Since a drop in 
stock price induces an increase in equity financing cost (Yang & Tsatsaronis, 2012) 
and thus a real adverse shock to the bank, we can establish a link that leads from a 
stock price decrease to decrease in capitalization due to lower profits/higher losses. 
In order to go one step further, we also analyze some other streams of information 
indicating that banks are also directly incentivized to take action and adjust their 
capitalization and risk profiles in reaction to the stress tests. 
A PricewaterhouseCoopers survey (2014) points out that the stress test results are a 
valuable asset to the bank and should be leveraged in decision-making. While this is 
not a common practise yet, some banks already report using them to define their 
future strategies, especially in terms of risk appetite (and, consequently, their 
capitalization levels). 
Finally, Goldstein and Sapra (2013), and Goldstein (2013) warn that high levels of 
information disclosure can have an adverse effect on the banking sector. Since the 
banks operate in a second-best environment with opaque risks that are difficult to 
verify, they may incline to inefficient solutions that help them improve their 
immediate capitalization and thus pass the test. They claim that the banks should not 
have access to the full methodology to prevent them from preparing themselves for 
the stress test and that a disclosure of only the aggregate results (as opposed to bank-
by-bank results) should be considered as a way to decrease this risk. 
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2.4 Hypotheses 
This paper provides a broader empirical analysis of the impact of stress tests on 
banks’ actual capitalization levels and risk profiles. Thanks to the construction of our 
models, we will provide an implicit test of some of the claims about the market 
reactions. Our aim, though, is mainly to test some new hypotheses that have not been 
scrutinized by the academic literature yet. In order to tackle this general issue, we 
decompose it into smaller components as stated in the following hypotheses: 
H1: Stress tests force banks with worse results to increase their 
capitalization levels. 
There are two potential channels of transmission that could compel risky banks to 
increase their capitalization. The banks can adjust their capitalization levels based on 
direct acquisition of new information about the sector or due to to the pressure 
exerted by the authorities. 
On the one hand, the results are unlikely to reveal relevant new information to the 
banks about themselves as their internal models and own sources provide data that 
are far more detailed. On the other hand, the banks have limited information about 
their competitors and potential counterparties, the overall state of the sector, and the 
amount of available capital. With the individual results published, banks can uncover 
fragility at the industry level or in one of their counterparties. In that case, they are 
incentivised to adapt to those new risks. This is in line with a survey by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2014) where most banks reveal that the results provide 
useful insights which could be used for decisions on the amount of risk taken by the 
banks. 
Banks that achieved low levels of capitalization in the adverse scenario and thus 
found a lot of vulnerabilities would then try to remedy this state and counterweigh the 
new negative information that was revealed. Banks with high levels of capitalization, 
on the contrary, would be encouraged by the confirmed strong position and could 
either preserve or even increase their riskiness. 
Secondly, through the stress tests the banks receive information about the authorities 
and their expectations. By specifying what is defined as “extreme but plausible 
variations in one or more risk factors” (EBA, 2011b, p. 45) the regulators uncover 
their forecasting results and the scope of possible downturn. Through setting capital 
adequacy limits they show what an acceptable capitalization in such a situation is. 
This helps the banks estimate the expectations of the authorities and puts pressure on 
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those that do not comply yet. In 2011 this principle was even institutionalized and the 
EBA tracked and commented on the results of the banks that did not pass or only 
passed barely (EBA, 2012). 
On the other hand, Petrella and Resti (2013) show that the markets reacted to the 
results published after the 2011 stress test and rewarded banks that had higher levels 
of Core Tier 1 capital under the stressed scenario with abnormal returns. This would 
mean a comparative loss for the banks that scored lower and thus a decrease in 
capitalization. We, however, believe that the two former channels grasp the situation 
better and thus banks with worse results should increase their capitalization after the 
results disclosure. 
Immediate changes in capitalization in reaction to the stress test results publication, 
however, are not the only possible channel of propagation. With the stress test 
announcements in advance and limited follow-up measures, the banks have space to 
prepare themselves and re-adjust the capitalization after the stress tests if that suits 
their strategies. To examine this case, following hypotheses are analyzed: 
H2: Banks anticipate stress tests and adjust their risk profiles so that 
they achieve better result; 
H3: Banks reverse the adjustments afterwards. 
The motivation for this seemingly unreasonable conduct is public perception and 
marketing. Every bank that holds less than 100% of their deposits in reserves faces 
the risk of a bank run which may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Jussim (2012) 
shows that in case of a negative signal about the bank’s situation it is rational for 
depositors to withdraw their funds. Moreover, according to game theory model by 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), it is rational to try and be among the first to withdraw 
the money and to do so even if one knows that the negative signal was in fact not 
truthful.  
Therefore, in order to prevent such situation it is crucial to maintain an image of a 
strong and stable brand. Frandsen, Hiller, Traflet, and McGoun (2013) write in their 
study that for “money [to be] saved, customers must think that the bank is secure and 
their money will be there when they want it” and Bulsara, Desai, and Miniaoui 
(2015) identify safety, band perception, and risk appetite as three of the key factors 
influencing the depositors when they invest their money. Furthermore, globalization 
of the markets and increasing competition motivate banks to always present 
themselves as safer than their peers – and one of the most conspicuous comparisons 
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are stress tests where banks are scrutinized by the authorities based on common rules 
and unified scenarios of economic downturn. 
That puts the banks in a situation well described by the prisoner’s dilemma. Each of 
them is incentivized to try and have better results than the competitors. Since the 
situation is symmetrical, everybody increases capitalization but in the end nobody 
gets an edge over the competitors and everybody ends up worse off. Similar 
reasoning was presented in Goldstein (2013) who warns that banks can behave 
inefficiently while they try to ‘game’ the stress test by adjusting their exposures. 
Although the initial intention of the banks is stabilization in this case, the ultimate 
situation would be one with increased volatility. With each stress test they would be 
pushed to temporarily decrease their risk to achieve better result. Finally, this 
situation could even lead to a chain reaction in which all the subjects are trying to get 
rid of risky assets which cause the assets to lose their value even faster and the last 
one suffers as it has a portfolio of illiquid assets whose price dropped massively. 
The current consumer protection policies in Europe try to prevent such scenarios and 
calm the markets. The deposit insurance adopted after the crisis years by the EU 
grants each account holder coverage up to € 100 000 per bank within 7 days 
(European Commission, 2010). Consequently, importance of safety of the banks per 
se is probably not so important for most small depositors and banks do not need to 
fight so fiercely to please the depositors. On the other hand, the EU banking sector 
has been growing rapidly with its assets reaching as much as 334% of EU GDP and 
some argue that the individual countries responsible for bank resolutions are simply 
too small to fulfil such commitment (Pagano et al., 2014, p. 4). 
But was it indeed possible for the banks to expect the stress tests in advance? At the 
least, for the 2010 stress test they had a month between the official announcements 
and the date from which the balance sheets were taken (balance sheet date). The 
exercise was officially announced on December 3
rd 
and the balance sheet date was 
December 31
st
. For the 2011 exercise the announcement was delayed to January, 
which might have had an effect on this channel, but even in this case the banks could 
have followed the EU negotiations and some other signals that could help them 
predict the exercise. We hope to get further clarification of the situation from our 
results.  
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 H4: The results of H1, H2, and H3 will be the same for both the 2010 
and the 2011 stress tests. 
Analyzing data from the two stress tests provides a valued opportunity to test the 
hypotheses separately for each of them and interpret the results in the light of their 
differences. Both of the stress tests were performed with only one year gap and on a 
very similar set of banks. Despite that, there are crucial technical and qualitative 
differences between the two cases which could potentially prompt differing reactions.  
Firstly, the 2010 exercise only presented very humble amount of information about 
the results. One year later, thousands of data points for each bank including detailed 
exposures were revealed (Enria, 2011). 
Secondly, the latter exercise could be seen as more strict. The already stressed 
scenario from the end of 2010 was intensified and the threshold was defined in terms 
of Tier 1 capital as opposed to Core Tier 1 capital
4
 in year 2011 (EBA, 2011e). 
Despite that, some doubts have emerged, whether this tightening was sufficient. As 
Candelon and Sy (2015) point out it is not clear whether the scenarios reflected 
sufficiently the demise in market conditions where yields on Greek bonds were 
growing rapidly (by 46% between the date of stress test announcement and results 
publishing and by 183% annually as seen in Figure 1).  
Figure 1: Greece government bond 10-year yields 
 
Source: Bloomberg (2015). 
Note: Figure displays closing values of the first day of each month. 
                                                 
4
 Core Tier 1 capital is based on the Capital Requirements Directive and is constructed by taking Tier 
1 capital and deducting hybrid instruments including preference shares. Government support is 
recognized in Core Tier 1 capital. At the beginning of 2011 the deducted hybrid instruments accounted 
in total for 17% of Tier 1 capital for the stress tested banks. 
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In order to discern the effects of the first and second stress test, we will include 
separate variables for each of them in our models. Then, in case the hypotheses 1-3 
are answered differently for the two exercises, we will seek whether some features of 
the bank reactions are based on the specifications of the stress test. That could help us 
understand the relationship more thoroughly and evaluate the potential impact of 
other changes to the qualitative and quantitative aspects in the future. 
It is important to note that in this paper we use two notions interchangeably. Firstly, it 
is the level of capitalization and stress test results which, for the sake of this study, 
are called good in case of high values and bad in case of low values. Secondly, it is 
the riskiness of the banks (both to themselves and the markets). In this, we follow the 
regulatory point of view which is trying to achieve higher (better) capitalization to 
strengthen the market resilience and reduce both overall and individual risk (see e.g. 
Berger, Klapper, & Turk-Ariss, 2008; French et al., 2010; Greenspan, 2010).  
The two factors that we omit through this simplification are: a) from bank’s point of 
view, higher levels of capitalization do not necessarily mean ‘better capitalization’ 
owing to the fact that they limit liquidity creation and with it profitability (Diamond 
& Rajan, 2000); b) despite regulators extensively using regulatory capital ratios as a 
tool to mitigate risks, the link is still being disputed by some who claim that it may 
vary significantly among banks (Laeven & Levine, 2009) or even have the exact 
opposite impact (J. Blum, 1999). 
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3 Data & Methodology 
3.1 Data 
In order to provide reliable estimates, we collected data from a number of sources and 
we aimed to obtain the widest possible range of observations available at the date of 
writing. Crucial element which enables us to study the impact of stress tests are the 
results of the two exercises performed in the EU in years 2010 and 2011 by the EBA 
(until the end of the year 2010 known as the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors). One more stress test predated the two (in 2009) but the results were not 
published and thus it could not be included in our study. Each of the two provides 
results for 91 banks (there were changes among the participating banks but the 
majority of the set remained the same). Although a range of data points was 
published (especially in 2011), our attention is primarily with the information on 
banks’ capitalization levels during the over the adverse periods. 
The 2010 stress test was announced in December 2009 and took place the following 
year with the results being published in July only 15 days after the methodological 
note was published. 91 major banks and banking groups from the EU participated, 
covering over 65% of EU banking sector in terms of total assets (CEBS, 2010c).  
On top of the aim to scrutinize the sector resilience, it also focused on public support 
dependence and the ability to absorb further shocks on credit and market risks. The 
exercise was performed on a “bottom-up” basis, thus focusing on individual banks 
and not aggregating on the level of portfolios.  
Main features of the adverse scenario were: a) general economic downturn, mostly 
pronounced by a total 3 percentage point decrease of GDP in EU over the two years 
compared to EC’s predictions (Figure 2); b) worsening of overall market conditions 
as a result of sovereign shock and sovereign exposure valuation haircut (Figure 2). 
With the adverse scenario causing total of 566bn € losses, average Tier 1 ratio 
decreased more than a percentage point over the two years from 10.3% to 9.2% 
which is, however, still above both exercise threshold 6% and minimum 4% required 
by the regulators at that time. The good average state is partly owed to 197bn € 
support capital from governments provided until July 2010 (CEBS, 2010d). Due to 
high differences among the individual entities, however, seven institutions failed to 
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maintain their Tier 1 capital above 6% over the two stressed years, totalling 3.5bn € 
shortfall (CEBS, 2010b). 
Figure 2: GDP growth under adverse scenario, 2010 
 
Sources: 2010 EU-wide stress test (CEBS, 2010b). 
Table 1: Valuation haircuts to sovereign debt holdings, 2010 




















Czech Republic 11.4% 
Poland 12.3% 
Other non-euro area EU 11.8% 
EU average 8.5% 
Sources: 2010 EU-wide stress test (CEBS, 2010b) 
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The second of the two exercises built extensively on the previous one, but as the EBA 
itself noted, “... [it] took into account areas where improvements compared to the 
2010 exercise were deemed necessary as a result of a ‘lessons learnt‘ analysis 
conducted by the EBA and all the involved authorities in the aftermath of the 2010 
exercise” (EBA, 2011c, p. 2). It was announced in January 2011 with the results 
published in July, again covering 91 banks and banking groups and around 65% of 
total EU banking assets (Forssbaeck & Oxelheim, 2014). 
The first change compared to the previous year is that the 2011 exercise introduced 
more stringent rules. Firstly, to isolate only the most liquid assets, the threshold was 
defined in more restrictive Core Tier 1 capital which is defined as “Tier 1 net of 
deductions of participations in financial institutions and ... hybrid instruments 
including existing preference shares” (EBA, 2011a, p. 27). The new 5% threshold is 
then consistent with the fact that Tier 1 capital was approximately 117% of Core Tier 
1 capital during the exercise. Yet, the EBA stated that institutions scoring between 
5% and 6% are still vulnerable and national authorities should take remedial steps to 
help strengthen their capital positions (EBA, 2011d).  
The adverse scenario was again focusing primarily on credit, market, and sovereign 
risks. Through combination of EU shocks, global demand shock originating in the 
US, and USD depreciation EU GDP growth was expected to decrease by total 4 pp 
from the EC forecast compared to 3 pp previous year (Figure 3).  
Figure 3: GDP growth under adverse scenario, 2011  
 
Sources: 2011 EU-wide stress test (EBA, 2011b) 
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Average Core Tier 1 capital ratio decreased over the simulated two years from 8.9% 
in 2010 (including government support totalling 160bn €) to 7.7% in 2012. Eight 
banks failed to sustain their capital above the 5% limit and together amount to 2.5bn 
€ shortfall. Sixteen more banks were categorized as ‘barely passed’ with the result 
between 5% and 6% (EBA, 2011a). 
Apart from the stress test methodology, the 2011 exercise distinguished itself by one 
more feature – it served as a massive source of information. While in 2009 the results 
were not published at all and in 2010 only 149 data points per bank were released, in 
2011 3,400 data points per bank were released in a unified format, with a clear 
intention to make their analysis as simple as possible.  
Regarding the remainder of our dataset, the detailed information on each of the 
banks, their size, profitability, activities, and changes in regulatory capital were 
obtained from the BankScope database which provides the most comprehensive 
coverage concerning banks’ financial statements. To accommodate the frequency and 
amount of missing values in BankScope, the final dataset that we use for our 
estimations spans over 5 years from first half of year 2009 to the second half of year 
2013 with a 6-monthly frequency. By including observation before and after the 
stress tests we hope to avoid the risk of radical changes at the edges of the dataset 
which could negatively affect the results. Finally, information on macroeconomic 
conditions in the EU and the individual countries were retrieved from Eurostat.  
The following estimations use data on 65 banks. Firstly, there are 48 banks that took 
part at least in one of the stress tests and for which the data on their financial 
statements are available and complete. Secondly, to account for trends within the 
industry which could potentially cause the type II error
5
, we also include 17 
institutions that did not take part in either of the exercises. To choose a relevant 
sample, we only consider banks that sustained total assets above 25bn € over the 
years 2009-2013 (that is the size of the smallest bank in our dataset that took part in 
at least one stress test). Also, seeking a control sample as close as possible to the 
banks that participated in the stress tests, we limit ourselves to those classified by 
BankScope in the following specializations: a) Savings bank, b) Specialized 
governmental credit institution, c) Cooperative bank, d) Commercial bank, and e) 
Bank holdings & holding companies.  
 
                                                 
5
 Failure to reject a false null hypothesis. 
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Figure 4: # of banks by 2010 stress test result (Tier 1 capital ratio, %)  
 
Sources: 2010 EU-wide stress test (CEBS, 2010a) 
Figure 5: # of banks by 2011 stress test result (Core Tier 1 capital ratio, %)  
 
Sources: 2011 EU-wide stress test (EBA, 2011d) 
Note: The absolute values are not comparable for both figures, since the values are in Tier 1 capital 
ratio and Core Tier 1 capital ratio for the years 2010 and 2011, respectively.  
Given the high number of banks that did not provide complete information over the 
whole period, we need to be cautious about pre-selection bias in the dataset. 
Especially smaller banks with extreme scores (either with very high capitalization or 
very low capitalization) had missing values in the dataset or went bankrupt over the 
period (see Figure 4 and Figure 5). Fortunately, due to the nature of the research this 
should not cause any bias. Firstly, smaller banks with critically low capitalization are 
less likely to have the capacity and flexibility to react adequately to outside incentives 
such as stress tests. Secondly, banks with high capitalization could ignore the results 
as they are already beyond a critical value where banks are considered to be 
completely safe and minimum capital requirements are thus not an active restriction. 
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Therefore, the inclusion of the extreme values in the sample could distort the results 
and their exclusion helps isolate the analyzed effect. On the other hand, we can 
expect that the results will suffer slightly due to decreased variation in the variables. 
Finally, we had to perform minor changes in the dataset in order to negate the effects 
of significant one-off changes that could distort our estimates. Namely, there were 
several banks that took part in major restructuring deals which altered their risk 
profile and consequently required a one-off change in regulatory capital. Hypo Real 
Estate was recapitalized and nationalized by Germany (Buder, Lienemeyer, Magnus, 
Smits, & Soukup, 2011), Dexia sold its Luxemburg unit as a part of its resolution 
plan (Bodoni, 2012), Bank of Ireland sold its securities division to reduce exposures 
(Brennan, 2011), and Allied Irish Plc. and SNS Bank N.V. which were nationalized 
by the Irish government in 2011 and 2013, respectively (Enrich, 2011; Van Gaal & 
Van Der Starre, 2013). These extreme observations of capitalization change were 
replaced by the average of the change in the previous and following periods. 
3.2 Methodology 
In order to choose the optimal model specification which will provide efficient and 
unbiased estimates for our panel data, we will be choosing between Fixed Effects 
model (FE), Random Effects model (RE), and pooled Ordinary Least Squares model 
(p-OLS). 
The most simple and straightforward selection would be the p-OLS. This is a 
preferred solution for cases where group specific effect is observed or only contains 
constant term in which case it produces results that are both consistent and efficient. 
The specificity of p-OLS is that it does not take into account the panel structure of the 
data and evaluates each data entry independently. Generally, though, p-OLS can be 
suboptimal as the results tend to be biased due to unaccounted for heterogeneity 
across the entities. 
Indeed, as we have noted earlier, Laeven and Levine (2009) show that bank specific 
factors such as ownership structure can be significant in predicting the riskiness of 
banks. The proposition is also backed by our preliminary analysis which shows 
notable differences in bank reaction based on their specialization (Table 2). This 
could indicate that our model of choice is FE which is equipped to account for effects 
on the level of entity that could influence the estimated parameters. It assumes that 
the individual effects are time-invariant and uncorrelated with individual 
characteristics of other groups. That also means that the error term and intercept 
should not be correlated with between entities. Omitted variable bias is therefore not 
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an issue for time-invariant variables. Also, time-invariant variables cannot be 
estimated by FE but this is not our concern since they are not the focus of this paper.  
On the other hand, if the individual variations are random and they are not correlated 
with the independent variables, we can obtain more efficient estimates with the RE as 
it does not require estimating of so many parameters. 
After evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of each of the options, we select 
FE. This claim is also substantiated by the Durbin-Wu-Hausman specification test 
which confirms the selection of FE. Consequently, our results should now be 
unbiased, consistent, and unthreatened by the fixed characteristics of the individual 
entities. Since our panel is fairly short, the contemporaneous correlation is not a 
threat and thus we need not to worry. On the other hand, we find that our data suffer 
from heteroskedasticity, which we solve by using robust estimation. 
Finally, a common problem for FE models called ‘Nickell bias’ causes the estimates 
to be inconsistent with increasing number of cross-sectional units while keeping 
number of periods constant (Nickell, 1981). In our case, however, we will disregard 
this threat for two reasons. Firstly, with 10 periods and 65 cross-sectional units the 
threat is not so severe as it depends on infinite growth of the cross-sections and 
secondly, some recent research is showing that the remedies can sometimes be more 
harmful that the problem itself (N. L. Beck, Katz, & Mignozzetti, 2014). 
Due to the similarity of the problems in question and most of the dataset that we use 
for investigating the different questions, the choice of FE is valid for all of our 
estimations. Therefore, the choice of FE estimation with robust standard errors to 
account for heteroskedasticity in our sample will be utilized to study all our 
hypotheses.  
Table 2: Capitalization change by institution type (average, pp) 
  







Credit Inst. Savings Banks 
2010 0.34 0.41 0.18 1.75 0.34 
2011 -0.48 0.00 0.39 -1.07 1.03 
Sources: 2011 EU-wide stress test (EBA, 2011d), 2010 EU-wide stress test (CEBS, 2010a), 
BankScope (Bureau van Dijk, 2015). 
Note: The number of banks in each category is 10, 23, 6, 6, 2 and 10, 23, 6, 5, 2 for year 2010 and 
2011 respectively. Bank specializations are assigned according to the BankScope database. 
 
Empirical Analysis   29     29 
4 Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Immediate Reaction to the Stress Tests 
So far, academic literature did not provide much evidence of whether stress tests 
influence banks’ capitalization and risk levels. Moreover, factors affecting and 
potentially altering this relationship are also unknown. Previously, we have 
established two hypothetical links connecting immediate changes in bank 
capitalization to stress tests, specifically focusing on the effect of results of each 
bank.  
Firstly, through obtaining direct information about the banking sector and its 
competition the banks counterweigh the newly discovered vulnerabilities uncovered 
by scoring lower than their peers. They do so by decreasing their riskiness either 
through decrease of RWA or increase in their (Core) Tier 1 capital, thus increasing 
bank capitalization. Secondly, the less capitalized banks are being punished for their 
results by the authorities who either explicitly through public monitoring or implicitly 
through revealing the stress test thresholds force them to adjust their capitalization to 
meet some minimal requirements.  
To test this link, in this chapter we analyze our first hypothesis:  
H1: Stress tests force banks with worse results to increase their 
capitalization levels. 
A simple preliminary analysis of the data does provide some evidence regarding our 
hypothesis. Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the relationship between bank result and 
capitalization change within a five month period. After dividing the banks into three 
groups based on their results in the adverse scenario and plotting mean values of 
change in capitalization, we see linear relationships with varying implications for 
each exercise. In 2010, the banks with the worst results have seen stable 
capitalization levels, while the rest of the rest of the banks, including non-participants 
in the stress test, were increasing their capitalization levels at 0.62-0.72 pp over six 
months. In 2011, while the banks with the worst results were still stable, the 
capitalization decreased for banks with better results. Therefore, the 2011 case 
partially supports our hypothesis. 
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Figure 6: Average capital ratio adjustments by bank results, 2010 
 
Figure 7: Average capital ratio adjustments by bank results, 2011 
 
Sources:: 2010 EU-wide stress test (CEBS, 2010a), 2011 EU-wide stress test (EBA, 2011d), 
BankScope (Bureau van Dijk, 2015). 
Note: The banks are divided into four groups. Three according to their capitalization levels under the 
stressed scenario with 33% banks with highest results in High, 33% with lowest capitalization in Low, 
and the remaining 33% in Medium. Fourth group represents banks that did not participate in the stress 
tests. Values in parentheses indicate group average capitalization under the stress test. 
We can also draw some useful general insights that might help us understand the 
situation further. Firstly, within only one year we see a potential reversal of the 
relationship. This indicates either a severe change of market conditions or a 
potentially crucial impact of the several modifications in the stress test exercise. 
Secondly, while in 2010 the banks were improving their resilience (potentially still in 
reaction to the Great Recession), in 2011 we have seen declining on average (albeit 
slower than the previous increase). Thirdly, the one stable observed element is low or 
nil reactivity of banks with bad results.  
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Model 
In order to determine the banks’ reaction to the stress test results, as our dependent 
variable we choose the first difference of regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio (ΔT1_ratio) 
which is calculated as a change over the past 6 months in absolute terms. This 
selection was fairly straightforward, since it is widely used and the stress tests results 
are primarily presented and evaluated in terms of Tier 1 capital ratio
6
. Also, the 
measure is highly standardized among all institutions in the EU thanks to being the 
centrepiece of Basel regulations. To estimate impact of the stress tests, we use the 
following model: 
, 2010 2011 , , ,1_ i t i i i t i t t i tT ratio u            result_2010 result_2011 X Y Z  (1)  
where i identifies the bank and t identifies time period with: 
1...65i    and 1...10t  . 
In this model α, β2010, β2011, γ, δ, and ε are the estimated parameters and u is the error 
term. Our main focus lies with the first two vectors result_2010 and result_2011. If 
we only used one variable denoting the result, however, a significant result might be 
caused by overall decrease of capitalization in banks that took part in the stress test, 
not by their good or bad results. Therefore, we split the two effects and include a 
separate variable for each of them. Firstly, we include dummy variables with value 1 
for bank participating in the stress test in the given period and 0 otherwise 
(part_2010 and part_2011). Secondly, we use variables indicating the relative 
positioning with respect to the median result (result_2010_relative and 
result_2011_relative). By definition, these variables will take on values from -0.5 
for the bank with the worst score in the sample to 0.5 for bank with the best score in 
the sample. This will help us discern the two effects and provide deeper 
understanding of the impact. Furthermore, creation of separate variables for each 
stress test allows for the recognition of effects that only took place after one of the 
stress tests. It also enables us to seek causes for potential changes in these effects 
which we do in Hypothesis 4. 
Based on our hypothesis, we expect result_2010_relative and result_2011_relative 
to be significant and negative, indicating that banks with better results did not 
                                                 
6
 The 2011 stress test was evaluated using a redefined measure Core Tier 1 ratio which is more 
restrictive but it constitutes 83% of Tier 1 capital. Therefore, any change in Core Tier 1 capital is 
transmitted to Tier 1 capital with minimal disturbance. 
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increase their capitalization as much as the banks with worse results. As our 
hypotheses only substantiate increase in capitalization by the low-scoring banks, we 
do expect the part_2010 and part_2011 variables to be significant and positive, 
representing the average shift. 
X is a vector of bank specific variables. Owing to the fact that we are dealing with a 
FE model, the fixed bank specific characteristics are not included in the regression, 
which leaves us with only one variable. Income is defined as bank’s net income over 
average total assets over the two quarters (in percentage). It is important we use the 
relative value since it helps us reveal the potential to replenish reserves. A bank with 
high ratio of income to assets can potentially retain earnings, does not need to rely on 
the capital markets, and thus enjoys higher flexibility and safety (does not need to 
hold so much capital).  
Vector Y consist of country-level information on general macroeconomic conditions. 
The first included variable is GDP growth (ΔGDP_home) which represents the 
propensity of economic agents for intertemporal risk sharing. As Freixas and Rochet 
(1997) noted in their book, banks accumulate capital as a buffer for absorption of 
future shocks. In other words, we expect banks to ‘save for the rainy days’ when 
GDP is growing by increasing reserves and gradually dissolve the reserves when 
output is falling. The second variable is change in unemployment ΔU_home which 
can help the banks determine future of their portfolio before models such as VAR 
actually register any change in the default rates. We therefore expect that with 
growing unemployment the capitalization will be increasing, too. 
Lastly, vector Z contains similar set of variables on the level of EU. Since European 
integration and market liberalization deepened the intra-EU relationships, we witness 
very high levels of interconnectedness with the share of internal trade reaching as 
high as 65% in 2010 (Eurostat, 2014). To grasp these relationships, we include two 
variables which generalize the national-level variables and indicate the 
macroeconomic conditions of the EU at any given period: ΔGDP_EU and ΔU_EU. 
As a robustness check, in regression (3) we substitute our dependent variable for our 
own measure that is better equipped to deal with extreme values and outliers. This 
new variable is a discrete measure of change in Tier 1 capital ratio (disc_ΔT1_ratio) 
defined as presented in Table 3. By doing this, we decrease the influence of outliers 
that could have a significant impact in our sample where the variance is very limited 
(while normal business conditions lead to capitalization changes up to 2 pp, a change 
in bank strategy that our model does not account for could affect it by up to 10 pp). 
Also, this variable accounts for banks that might have disproportionately strong 
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reaction to some incentives to change capitalization. In this we follow Pasta (2009) 
who suggests that ‘discretizing’ a continuous variable can help discover non-linear 
relationships and provides a guide on how to proceed. 
Table 3: discrete_ΔT1_ratio variable definition 
Sources: 2011 EU-wide stress test (EBA, 2011d), 2010 EU-wide stress test (CEBS, 2010a), 
BankScope (Bureau van Dijk, 2015). 
Note: 2010 and 2011 represent number of banks changing their Tier 1 capital in second periods of the 
respective years. 
Results 
First and foremost, using Model 1 we reveal that the banks that participated in the 
2011 stress test did significantly decrease their capitalization levels within 6 months 
after the stress test publication (in comparison to other institutions that did not take 
part; reported in Table 4). Moreover, this finding is robust at a 1% significance level 
across multiple specifications using both the continuous and the discrete dependent 
variables. The same effect was not observed in the previous exercise where no 
significant difference between the participants and non-participants was discovered.  
Our regressions did not reveal variations in reactions based on the relative 
performance of the participants. This result cannot be entirely generalized as we had 
to drop 17 out of 18 banks who failed the stress test due to data availability but it 
should hold for the remainder of the banks as it was robust across all specifications. 
The findings produced by the regression therefore do not support our hypothesis and 
there is no evidence that the banks that scored low relative to their peers tried to 
‘catch up’ or that they were forced to alter their risk profile by the authorities. While 
our hypothesis was not confirmed, there are three theories that are in line with the 
presented results. Firstly, as we argue in hypotheses 2 and 3, there are incentives for 
the banks to temporarily increase their capitalization for the stress testing period. The 
ensuing decrease then could manifest itself as an overall decrease in bank 
capitalization. This theory, however, will be tested more thoroughly in the next 
subchapter. 
Situation ΔT1_ratio disc_ΔT1_ratio Obs. Total 2010 2011 
Extreme increase Higher than 2 3 49 4 2 
Significant increase 1 to 2 2 105 10 4 
Slight increase 0.5 to 1 1 151 21 12 
Stable -0.5 to 0.5 0 264 25 31 
Slight decrease -1 to -0.5 -1 45 2 8 
Significant decrease -2 to -1 -2 25 3 6 
Extreme decrease lower than -2 -3 11 0 2 
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Table 4: Immediate reaction to the stress tests 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  ΔT1_ratio ΔT1_ratio disc_ΔT1_ratio 
        
part_2010 0.08352 0.08352 0.08866 
 (0.136) (0.167) (0.140) 
result_2010_relative 0.52100 0.52100 0.23903 
 (0.380) (0.529) (0.359) 
part_2011 -0.67681*** -0.67681*** -0.79360*** 
 (0.205) (0.170) (0.239) 
result_2011_relative 0.47872 0.47872 0.53237 
 (0.810) (0.551) (0.806) 
income 0.17273* 0.17273** 0.24476*** 
 (0.091) (0.073) (0.087) 
ΔU_EU -0.04488 -0.04488 1.33279 
 (1.382) (1.308) (1.557) 
ΔGDP_EU 2.28123 2.28123 3.50074 
 (2.273) (2.204) (2.837) 
ΔU_home 2.03168** 2.03168** 1.53322 
 (0.874) (0.899) (1.056) 
ΔGDP_home -2.37454 -2.37454 -2.59228 
 (2.030) (1.954) (2.425) 
        
Observations 650 650 650 
R-squared 0.039 0.059 0.055 
Number of banks 65 65 65 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses. The model was estimated using fixed effects for each 
bank (within regression) with robust standard errors for regressions (1) and (3). Constants were 
included in the model but are not reported. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is 
indicated by ***, **, *, respectively. 
Secondly, one of the channels of transmission that we have discussed is a signalling 
from the side of the authorities who inform the banks about their attitudes. When the 
stress test shows that the bank is not capitalized enough for the envisioned adverse 
scenario the authorities should take remedial steps to solve the problem and ascertain 
their authority. But as Ellahie (2013) noted, the actions of the EBA may have lacked 
decisiveness and thus revealed weakness of the authorities. The banks that 
participated in the stress test therefore experienced a situation when the regulators are 
not decisive enough to punish them for their mistakes. This would further promote 
risk-taking and enable the banks to decrease their capitalization.  
Thirdly, suffering from the prolonged downturn after the Great Recession the markets 
had only little information about the banking sector. Unable to evaluate the quality of 
their counterparties’ assets and their overall financial health, the stress test provided a 
benchmark and sufficient amount of data upon which the markets could build. 
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Thanks to the information disclosure, the exercise led to one of the first general 
reviews of the overall banking sector health. The counterparties, revealing that the 
exposures are more severe than previously expected (Ellahie, 2013), then punished 
the banks by a higher risk premium. As we have established earlier, this would lead 
to a shock followed by a decrease in profitability and capitalization. Even here, the 
discussed indecisiveness of the authorities could have affected the situation for the 
worse. 
In the interpretation we gravitate mostly to the last theory. As is presented in our 
results the banks with higher income did not undergo such dramatic capitalization 
decrease. We see this as a sign that they had the means to partially or fully absorb an 
involuntary shock. If this argument holds, the two former theories are partially 
invalidated since they represent a deliberate decrease which the banks have no need 
to absorb. Also, the first two conclusions are contradictory to the findings of a survey 
performed by the PricewaterhouseCoopers (2014) where the banks themselves in 
95% of cases report that the stress test results are never or very rarely used to change 
future strategy.  
If this theory holds, the markets suffered to a large degree due to the regulators who 
put themselves into situation where they did not have enough decisiveness to carry 
out the implied obligations. Despite the negative impact our model discovered, 
however, there is a significant upside potential. The 2009 US SCAP exercise has 
proven that the markets can be stabilized by a stress test exercise if the scenario is 
relevant and the follow-up actions credible (Langley, 2013). Therefore, instead of 
producing more uncertainty, the stress test could potentially be a great tool to 
decrease it and fight situations such as credit crunch.  
The authorities have means to prevent this situation in the future but they come at a 
cost. For example results could be presented on an aggregate level (or not at all) and 
not on a bank-by-bank basis. This would mitigate the adverse market reaction to the 
individual banks and decrease the negative impact. On the other hand, disclosure 
promotes discipline and monitoring by the public has been hailed on multiple 
occasions as very efficient (Barth, Caprio, & Levine, 2004, 2008; Beltratti & Stulz, 
2012). This benefit would be lost. 
Empirical Analysis   36     36 
4.2 Capitalization Adjustments in Anticipation of the 
Stress Tests and Their Reversal Afterwards 
By focusing only on the reaction after the stress test, we risk missing some potentially 
significant relationships. There are indications that the banks could have learned 
about the tests in advance and adjust their capitalization ex-ante as discussed in the 
Hypotheses section. This would help them achieve better score through which the 
bank signals good health and stability. Especially at times of interbank uncertainty 
and lack of transparency due to large amounts of complex structured finance products 
in the banks’ balance sheets this might be a valuable tool to calm the stakeholders. In 
turn, this action would help obtain cheaper liquidity due to decreased uncertainty of 
other banks and it would decrease the probability of market panic and bank runs. 
The EU strives to mitigate such situations by providing safeguards, most notably the 
deposit insurance of 100 000 € per customer per bank. But with such a rapid growth 
of the banking sector as we have seen in the EU, it is not clear whether some 
countries would be able to fulfil this commitment (Pagano et al., 2014). Then the 
depositors would seek out and evaluate publicly available signals such as stress test 
results and the banks would be pushed to temporarily increase their capitalization. In 
the aftermath of the stress test this temporary elevation of the capitalization levels 
would become redundant because the short window of transparency would have 
expired. The banks would then return to their original equilibria with lower level of 
capitalization enabled by the lower transparency. To clarify the actual mechanisms 
we test the following hypotheses: 
H2: Banks anticipate stress tests and adjust their risk profiles so that 
they achieve better result; 
H3: Banks reverse the adjustments afterwards. 
Brief look at the data offers some indication that the first of our two hypotheses might 
hold. When we divide banks according to their results into three groups, there is a 
weak distinctive pattern in 2010 to be recognized. We see that banks participating in 
the stress test increased their capitalization on average more than the non-
participants. There is no stable relationship with regards to the future results of the 
banks. In 2010 we see that a group of banks that increased their capitalization the 
least is the one that eventually achieved the worst result. On the other hand, this 
relationship was entirely reversed in 2011. Similar instability can be observed for the 
group with medium results which saw the greatest capitalization increase in 2010 and 
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the lowest in 2011. The main finding that the participants have higher average 
increase in capitalization before the test, however, holds for the 2011 exercise, too. 
Figure 8: Average ex-ante capital ratio adjustments by bank results, 2010 
  
Figure 9: Average ex-ante capital ratio adjustments by bank results, 2011 
  
Sources: 2010 EU-wide stress test (CEBS, 2010a), 2011 EU-wide stress test (EBA, 2011d), 
BankScope (Bureau van Dijk, 2015). 
Note: Adjustments are over 6 month period between 1 Jul and 31 Dec prior to the balance sheet date. 
The banks are divided into four groups. Three according to their capitalization levels under the 
stressed scenario with 33% banks with highest results in High, 33% with lowest capitalization in Low, 
and the remaining 33% in Medium. Fourth group represents banks that did not participate in the stress 
tests. Values in parentheses indicate group average capitalization under the stress test. 
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Model 
As our primary dependent variable we use change in regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio 
(ΔT1_ratio) due to its widespread use and codification. To check the robustness of 
our results in some of the regressions we substitute our dependent variable with a 
redefined discrete version (disc_ΔT1_ratio). Similarly to Model 1, the vectors X, Y, 
and Z containing the variables Income, ΔGDP_home, ΔU_home, ΔGDP_EU, and 
ΔU_EU are included in our model. With them, we are able to control for other effects 
potentially influencing the dependent variable such as the changes in home 
country/EU macroeconomic conditions and the ability of the bank to swiftly increase 
capitalization through retaining earnings. Notation also remains the same and α, β2010, 
β2011, γ, δ, and ε are the estimated parameters and u is the error term.  
In Model 2 (reported in Table 5), we focus on H2 and include variables to determine 
how the banks’ behaviour was affected by the future participation in the stress tests. 
In order to affect the results, the banks had to anticipate the stress test and make any 
changes in the second period of the previous year. Therefore we take two period leads 
of independent variables from Model 1, obtaining part_2010_2lead and 
part_2011_2lead (this variable is 1 for the to-be stress test participants in the period 
before balance sheet date and 0 otherwise). With these variables we will be able to 
determine, whether the expectation of participation in a stress test impacts the 
decisions about adjustments of Tier 1 capital ratio. Moreover, we will be able to 
differentiate between the two exercises thanks to including separate variable for each 
of them. Since the bank only knows whether it will participate but has no information 
about the future results, we do not include variables capturing its relative 
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In Model 3 (reported in Table 6) we study whether any previous adjustments to the 
capitalization levels have been reversed after the short period of forced transparency 
passed (as the H3 proposes). To study this reversal, we use lags of variables denoting 
capitalization change in the periods prior to the balance sheet dates 
(ΔT1_ratio_2010_lag, ΔT1_ratio_2011_lag, ΔT1_ratio_2010_2lag, and 
ΔT1_ratio_2011_2lag). This variable is only defined for the stress test participants 
and is 0 otherwise. In other words, we try to reveal whether an ex-ante increase in 
capitalization was offset by an ex-post decrease in either of the two following 
periods: 
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    (3) 
With the current setup, however, in the second period of 2010 there are two effects at 
work: the reversal of the result from the 2010 exercise (ΔT1_ratio_2010_2lag) and 
the preparation for the 2011 exercise (part_2011_2lead). To verify our results and 
reconcile the two hypotheses we also provide Model 4 which contains both of them 
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Results 
Table 5 reports the estimates of our model focusing on bank ex-ante changes in 
capitalization. The results are not very surprising and provide some support for our 
hypothesis. We find that the coefficient for part_2010_2lead is positive which 
indicates that prior to the 2010 stress test the participating banks increased their 
capitalization on average by 0.36 pp more than the banks that did not participate. 
Multiple specifications of the model verify the robustness of this result (on 5%, 10%, 
and 5% significance levels). This observation has not re-emerged in a similar way in 
the 2011 exercise for which we do not find a significant difference between the 
capitalization change of the participating and non-participating banks. 
This result shows that the motivation for banks to achieve good results in the stress 
tests even at the cost of producing inefficient portfolios is indeed an issue. If banks 
were to use this strategy consistently and extensively, this would be a serious threat to 
the stability of the banking sector since each stress test would induce capitalization 
swings translating to volatility in asset prices. Such conduct would also invalidate the 
stress test results and further harm the sector. This would be especially dangerous if 
the authorities were trying to use the stress test as a stabilization tool during turbulent 
times such as the 2009 US stress test which is commonly considered to be the 




Empirical Analysis   40     40 
Table 5: Ex-ante reaction to the stress tests 
  (4) (5) (6) 
  ΔT1_ratio ΔT1_ratio disc_ΔT1_ratio 
        
part_2010_2lead 0.35922** 0.35922* 0.46050** 
 (0.168) (0.187) (0.224) 
part_2011_2lead 0.19430 0.19430 0.19163 
 (0.176) (0.172) (0.182) 
income 0.18485* 0.18485** 0.25542*** 
 (0.093) (0.074) (0.090) 
ΔU_EU -1.68793 -1.68793 -0.71843 
 (1.565) (1.399) (1.691) 
ΔU_home 1.87168** 1.87168** 1.36736 
 (0.884) (0.904) (1.093) 
ΔGDP_EU -1.03405 -1.03405 -0.56739 
 (2.747) (2.369) (3.247) 
ΔGDP_home -2.30629 -2.30629 -2.45865 
 (2.147) (1.977) (2.549) 
        
Observations 650 650 650 
R-squared 0.036 0.036 0.035 
Number of banks 65 65 65 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses. The model was estimated using fixed effects for each 
bank (within regression) with robust standard errors for regressions (4) and (6). Constants were 
included in the model but are not reported. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is 
indicated by ***, **, *, respectively. 
Fortunately, the results show that this is not a persistent phenomenon and that did not 
repeat in 2011 where part_2011_2lead was positive but insignificant across all the 
specifications. That indicates that there are possibly efficient ways for the authorities 
to prevent this behaviour and prevent the unnecessary volatility. Since the hypotheses 
are not confirmed for the 2011 stress test, it is very unlikely that the underlying 
reason for the capitalization decline is caused by the banks artificially increasing and 
then lowering their riskiness.  
Hypothesis 3 is tested by the regressions reported in Table 6 where the results again 
provide some support to this hypothesis. The theory that banks only increase their 
capitalization temporarily and reverse these adjustments after the stress test holds at 
5% significance level for the 2010 stress test. This result is robust to changes of the 
dependent variable in regression (8) and (10) and inclusion of additional lags in the 
regressions (9) and (10).  
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Table 6: Ex-post reversal of the capitalization changes 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
ΔT1_ratio disc_ΔT1_ratio ΔT1_ratio disc_ΔT1_ratio 
          
ΔT1_ratio_2010_lag -0.39610** -0.54189** -0.43421** -0.58940** 
 (0.176) (0.254) (0.181) (0.259) 
ΔT1_ratio_2011_lag 0.09832 0.09320 0.01422 0.00906 








   (0.133) (0.152) 
income 0.21234** 0.28880*** 0.20023** 0.28158*** 
 (0.102) (0.099) (0.096) (0.095) 
ΔU_EU -0.86445 0.32153 -0.07860 1.05782 
 (1.348) (1.524) (1.264) (1.503) 
ΔU_home 1.60568* 1.00763 1.35979* 0.75499 
 (0.876) (1.062) (0.810) (1.022) 
ΔGDP_EU 0.76848 1.58058 1.65808 2.48443 
 (2.105) (2.660) (2.026) (2.571) 
ΔGDP_home -2.50074 -2.71901 -2.56393 -2.73974 
 (2.147) (2.559) (2.108) (2.508) 
      
Observations 650 650 650 650 
R-squared 0.041 0.052 0.043 0.054 
Number of banks 65 65 65 65 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses. The model was estimated using fixed effects for each 
bank (within regression) with robust standard errors. Constants were included in the model but are not 
reported. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, *, respectively. 
We also find that the variable ΔT1_ratio_2011_2lag is significant at 1% level in 
regressions (9) and (10). Since there has not been a significant change specific to the 
tested banks prior to the 2011 exercise, we do not believe this is attributable to a 
reversal of a temporary change. Rather, it seems to signify a sector-wide decline in 
capitalization levels that previously increased significantly as seen in Figure 8. 
Therefore, we will not pay much attention to this result in the remainder of this paper. 
Table 7 provides a robustness check for the previously presented results. We find that 
all variables except for one keep their significance levels. For part_2010_2lead the 
significance decreased to 20% after adding the second lag of capitalization change 
and remained at 5% without this change. Signs and magnitudes of the estimated 
coefficients remained mostly stable and no other major swings were observed. 
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Table 7: Ex-ante and ex-post changes in capitalization 
  (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 
ΔT1_ratio disc_ΔT1_ratio ΔT1_ratio disc_ΔT1_ratio 
          
part_2010_2lead 0.33850** 0.43309** 0.16677 0.27063 
 (0.163) (0.216) (0.150) (0.209) 
part_2011_2lead 0.16355 0.14720 0.01233 0.07543 
 (0.181) (0.183) (0.139) (0.198) 
ΔT1_ratio_2010_lag -0.37402** -0.51930** -0.42619** -0.57614** 
 (0.176) (0.253) (0.180) (0.258) 
ΔT1_ratio_2011_lag 0.09670 0.08859 0.01344 0.00856 








   (0.135) (0.150) 
Income 0.19785** 0.27220*** 0.19454** 0.27254*** 
 (0.095) (0.092) (0.094) (0.092) 
ΔU_EU -1.74442 -0.82867 -0.55399 0.30018 
 (1.520) (1.679) (1.414) (1.649) 
ΔU_home 1.79148* 1.23613 1.45086* 0.90373 
 (0.905) (1.080) (0.823) (1.035) 
ΔGDP_EU -1.08789 -0.68047 0.83618 1.07074 
 (2.670) (3.210) (2.418) (3.010) 
ΔGDP_home -2.26499 -2.43739 -2.47712 -2.56349 
 (2.217) (2.609) (2.150) (2.547) 
  
    
Observations 650 650 650 650 
R-squared 0.044 0.047 0.099 0.081 
Number of banks 65 65 65 65 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses. The model was estimated using fixed effects for each 
bank (within regression) with robust standard errors. Constants were included in the model but are not 
reported. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, *, respectively. 
4.3 Differences in Reaction to the 2010 and the 2011 
Stress Tests 
In the final part of our analysis, we scrutinize the differences in our results between 
the two stress tests. We identified two major factors that were altered within the year 
and that could impact the response of the markets. Firstly, the scenarios became more 
severe in the latter stress test while the passing mark remained effectively the same. 
Moreover, a zone where the banks are singled out and issued a warning has been put 
into place for banks that passed the test with a limited amount of capital above the 
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passing mark. At the same time, the literature also presents some doubts about the 
ability of the authorities to deal with the institutions that did not succeed and provide 
efficient solutions to the uncovered systemic issues (Candelon & Sy, 2015; Ellahie, 
2013; Langley, 2013). 
Secondly, information disclosure which was non-existent in the 2009 and only very 
limited in the 2010 stress tests became one of the most prominent aspects of the 2011 
EBA exercise. This news revived a massive debate among the experts who try to 
assess whether the benefits of disclosure outweigh the costs in this case (Committee 
on the Global Financial System, 2000; Goldstein & Sapra, 2013; Goldstein, 2013). 
H4: The results of H1, H2, and H3 will be the same for both the 2010 
and the 2011 stress tests. 
Results 
In our empirical analysis we have discovered two significant channels worth 
discussing. Each of them, however, only affected the banks in one of the stress tests. 
Firstly and uniquely to 2010, Models 2-4 revealed that the participating banks 
experienced an increase to their capitalization before the stress test and a reversal of 
this change just after the data were handed over to the authorities (results reported in 
Table 7). Secondly and uniquely to 2011, Model 1 shows that there was a significant 
decrease of capitalization for banks that participated in the stress test, regardless their 
results (reported in Table 4). But why did these results not emerge in both exercises? 
In the first case, we suspect that the difference was caused by the fact that the banks 
were not able to duly and reliably determine whether the stress test will take place in 
2011. That was caused by the fact that the balance sheets used were from the end of 
the year, while the exercise was announced one month later in January. On the other 
hand, one year earlier the 2010 exercise was already announced on the 3
rd
 December.  
Moreover, there are few pieces of information indicating that the banks did have a 
reason to expect them even earlier. Following the 2009 stress test results presentation 
to the Economic and Financial Affair Council of the EU in October, discussion on the 
EU level ensued and resulted in the Council calling upon CEBS for “[i]nformation, 
through stress testing, on the dependence of EU banks on public support and on the 
amount of capital available for further lending in the context of exit strategies 
(Council of the European Union, 2009a, p. 16)”. We believe that this discussion 
could have served as a warning to the banks. On top of that, earlier in 2009 there 
were some signals that the first CEBS exercise might repeat very soon. The Council 
of the European Union (2009b) concluded that stress tests should be repeated 
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regularly and specifically envisioned one in 2010. Moreover, the success of the US 
SCAP revealed the potentially positive effect in case the results are published on a 
bank-by-bank basis. 
For the 2011 stress test, on the other hand, we did not find similar early indicators. 
Despite a calming effect of the 2010 exercise on the markets (Candelon & Sy, 2015) 
it failed to repeat the US success and proved that stress testing is not a panacea. 
Further, we found no documents that would imply another stress testing exercise in 
the 2011 so strongly and early as it happened in the previous year. And finally, the 
official announcement took place later. The banks, therefore, did not have a reason to 
expect another round of testing. 
In this regard, we evaluate the EBA’s behaviour positively as we see a fast reaction 
(postponing the announcement) which prevented these temporary adjustments and 
unnecessary volatility. Moreover, this strategy was used again in 2014 with 
announcement of the stress test at the end of January. This indicates that the EBA, 
despite the large amount of criticism, is at least partially successful in their effort to 
systematically improve the exercises.  
In the second case, we argue that there were two factors contributing to the negative 
market reaction and following capitalization levels demise in 2011 (Table 4). Firstly, 
Candelon and Sy (2015) note that despite the overall tightening of the conditions the 
adverse scenarios did not reflect the rapid worsening of the market conditions 
sufficiently (especially driven by the skyrocketing Greek bond yields). Similar 
concerns were raised by Jenkins and Murphy (2011), who consider the lack of the 
inclusion of Greek sovereign default to be a repeated error, and Alloway (2011), who 
points out that the adverse scenario was still much less strict that the one applied in 
the UK stress test. 
The exercise was then further undermined by a massive bailout to Dexia which was 
at the brink of bankruptcy (Peston, 2011). Dexia came in joint 12
th 
place out of 91 
participants with more than double the minimal required capital under the adverse 
scenario. The 90bn € capital injection only three months after the bank was labelled 
healthy by the results of the 2011 stress test was then the final blow to the credibility 
of the exercise.  
Secondly, the exercise lacked an action plan on how to deal with the banks that fail or 
nearly fail the stress test. Contrary to the 2009 US stress test, apart from 
recommendations to the national authorities there was no specific commitment or 
recapitalization plan in place (Candelon & Sy, 2015; Ellahie, 2013). This was not 
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specific to the 2011 stress test only, but in combination with the aforementioned lack 
of credibility it further destabilized the banking sector.  
The overall image was then that of an exercise which is very costly, too mild to 
uncover the issues that might realistically appear and lacking the decisiveness to deal 
with the problems that eventually might come up.  
We derive several lessons from this result. The severity of the adverse scenario 
should be evaluated strictly on the future projections of the markets and taking into 
account all options, even if they are ‘politically difficult’. Evaluating the severity in 
comparison to the previous exercise is therefore not sufficient to capture the real 
market conditions. 
The authorities should have a credible, well-defined back-up plan. In case any serious 
problems are discovered, the authorities should have a strategy and sufficient 
resources to solve them efficiently and ensure the markets that they have the situation 
under control. In 2011, we have seen neither of these. Specification of reaction to the 
results was vague (a ‘recommendation to the national authorities’) and the individual 
countries were supposed to discipline banks that were in some cases simply too large 
and important for them. 
If we go back to one of the definitions of macroprudential stress testing, the objective 
specified by CEBS is to “assess the overall resilience of the EU banking sector and 
the banks’ ability to further absorb possible shocks ... (CEBS, 2010e, p. 1)”. In the 
light of our results, we agree with the definition but it seems that CEBS/EBA did not 
fully recognize one simple fact. The authorities are an integral part of the banking 
sector. If the authorities outline simple and efficient rules, the sector benefits from 
higher stability and less uncertainty. If the rules are confusing and the markets are not 
certain that they will be enforced, uncertainty grows and stability declines.  
Stress tests do not simply reveal fragility in the banks’ balance sheets – they also 
reveal the quality of the regulation on the market. It is not only about the quantitative 
and technical parameters of the exercise but also about the overall strength and 
commitment of the authorities. Consequently, if a stress test is to be performed 
successfully, the authorities must also be prepared to bear significant costs.  
The most fitting theoretical foundation explaining the importance of this phenomenon 
is probably presented by the institutional economics. As Buchanan (1987) noted in 
his speech: “[c]learly, the differing institutional structures may, themselves, affect 
choice behavior.” Therefore, the market outcome is not only determined by the 
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conditions and choices of the individual banks. It is also heavily influenced by the 
rules within which the banks operate and the institutions that govern them.  
Finally, decreasing the information disclosure level would not necessarily eliminate 
this threat. If the authorities conduct a stress test without publishing any results, the 
markets still expect them to remedy any problems. If no action is undertaken and 
some of the banks fail just few months later, this is again a signal (albeit weaker) that 
the banking sector is not regulated efficiently. 
With the presented evidence we reject our fourth hypothesis. Despite only a very 
short time period between the both tests and no dramatic changes to the methodology, 
we find that the reactions differed substantially. We believe the change was based on 
the fact that the EBA strives to derive valuable lessons and improve the methodology, 
but the fast moving market conditions present it with ever new challenges.  
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5 Conclusion 
In this thesis, we examine whether macro stress tests conducted by national and 
international authorities impact risk profiles of the tested banks. Specifically, we 
focus on the 2010 and 2011 exercises performed in the EU by the CEBS/EBA and 
test how they impacted the banks’ capitalization levels. Our results suggest a 
significant impact on capitalization dependent on the stress test execution.  
Firstly, we find that in 2010 the banks tried to decrease their risk levels just before the 
stress tests and reverse these adjustments afterwards to present themselves as safer 
institutions to their stakeholders. In this, we empirically substantiate some previously 
raised theoretical concerns.  
This behaviour is a token of competitive behaviour and could help decrease the 
probability of a run for the individual bank. On the other hand, we believe that the 
symmetricity of the situation resulted in a state of artificial volatility where everyone 
is worse off. Fortunately, we registered an improvement in 2011, where this effect 
disappeared. We attribute this change to the fact that the stress test announcement 
was postponed and there was no timely and reliable enough indication that the 2011 
exercise will take place.  
Secondly, we find a significantly negative impact of the 2011 stress test on the 
capitalization levels of the participating banks compared to the non-participants. We 
believe that the decrease was caused by the inability of the regulators to present a 
relevant scenario and credible commitment to solving the issues that could arise from 
the exercise. By performing the exercise, rather than injecting the markets with 
confidence like the US 2009 SCAP exercise did, the EBA destabilized them. This 
increased the cost of funding which further translated to losses and decreased 
capitalization of the banks. 
In view of this information, we conclude that stress tests do not simply test the 
resilience of the banks’ balance sheets but also the ability and capacity of the 
authorities to act when needed. The authorities should therefore recognize this 
responsibility and only perform stress tests when their financial and political capacity 
allows it.  
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Finally, a comparison of the two exercises shows that despite their quick succession 
and methodological similarity the impact on capitalization levels of the participating 
banks was vastly different. Therefore, we argue that even minor changes in execution 
– both qualitative and quantitative – can be crucial to the overall success of the 
exercise. 
Since this is the first paper empirically analyzing the link of stress testing and bank 
riskiness, we offer two ways to extend it. The first and the more straightforward one 
is inclusion of other stress tests from around the world to verify the robustness of our 
results. The second one is a case study focusing on the differences between stress 
tests which would help determine more accurately the triggers of the individual 
channels. 
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